'The Arbitral Tribunal hereby issues the following Procedural Order to decide Claimants' petition entitled "Claimants' Application for Correction and Interpretation of the Procedural Order No. 15 Dated November 12, 2002" submitted on December 12, 2002 ("Claimants' Application").

I. Background

1. On November 12, 2002, the Arbitral Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 15 dismissing Claimant's Motion-as defined in Procedural Order No. 10 of September 17, 2002-for the reasons set forth therein.

2. On December 12, 2002, Claimants filed Claimants' Application.

3. On December 15, 2002, the Arbitral Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 20 granting Respondents the opportunity to comment on Claimants' Application.

4. On December 20, 2002, Respondents answered Claimants' Application, opposing it.

5. On December 23, 2002, the Arbitral Tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 22, pointing out that Claimants' Application would be decided promptly, together with other outstanding issues, after Claimants' response, if any, to certain motion and request submitted by Respondents.

II. Evaluation of Claimants' Application

1. Procedural Order No. 15 deals with Claimants' motion to grant some conservatory measures, and declines to do so.

2. Such decision, in turn, was issued in the form of a Procedural Order instead of an Interim Award, under the authority of Article 23.1 of the ICC Rules, and for the reasons set forth in § II thereof.

3. This reminder is relevant here because Claimants' Application is based on Article 29.2 of the ICC Rules1, which forms part of the provision on "Correction and Interpretation of the Award", not of Procedural Orders.

This sole consideration would be enough to dismiss Claimants Application.

4. Notwithstanding, the Tribunal considers that the above ground for dismissal might be regarded as "form over substance" 2 and, therefore, undertakes the analysis of Claimants' Application from the perspective of its actual content and in the context of the scope of "corrections and interpretations":

a. The possibility of parties to an arbitration to apply for corrections and interpretation is an innovation of the 1998 revision of the ICC Rules.

b. As to the first (corrections), the very text of Article 29.2 of the ICC Rules defines their scope when referring to those set forth in Article 29.1 ibidem, which clearly and exclusively covers clerical, computational, typographical or similar errors.

It is evident that Claimants' Application, which seeks to clarify and explain why certain documents "did not constitute sufficient evidence in support of the Claimants' Motion, and have not even [been] mentioned in PO No. 15",3 exceeds by far, and even under the more liberal approach, the concept of "corrections" contained in Article 29 of the ICC Rules.

c. As to the scope of "interpretation", which might be regarded as broader than the "correction" feature, there is virtual unanimity that an application of that sort cannot be used to seek revision, reformulation or additional explanations of a given decision.

Granted that the ICC Rules do not define "interpretation", there is consistency in the points of view expressed by the following commentators and decisions:

During the drafting of the comparable [Article 29.2] provision in the UNCITRAL Rules, "interpretation" was intended to refer to "clarification" of the dispositive part of the Award, i.e. the arbitrators could be requested to clarify "the purport of the award and the resultant obligations and rights of the parties" but not to revisit or elaborate upon the reasons for the Award4. (Emphasis added)

The purpose of the provision [Article 29.2] is to permit clarification of an award so as to permit its correct execution (as, for instance, if there would appear to be conflicting commands in the operative sections of the award). It is not to be used to require the tribunal to explain, or to reformulate, its reasons. It does not provide an occasion for the reconsideration by the tribunal of its decision. Should this be the case of the party's application the tribunal will be quite justified in finding it unnecessary or inappropriate to render the requested "interpretation" 5. (Emphasis added)

Once a decision has been given, it is only the contents that are authoritative, whatever may have been the view of the authors.6

The first was that "there must be a dispute as to the meaning and scope of a judgment" and the second that "the request should have for its object an interpretation of the judgment". The Court added that the request must relate to the dispositif . . . 7(Emphasis added)

[A]ccount has to be taken of the nature and limits of the right to request from a Court an interpretation of its decision. "Interpretation" is a process that is merely auxiliary . . . It poses the question, what was it that the Court decided with binding force in its decision, not the question what ought the Court now decide in the light of fresh facts or fresh arguments. A request for interpretation must, therefore, genuinely relate to the determination of the meaning and scope of the decision, and cannot be used as a means for its "revision" or "annulment", processes of a different kind to which different considerations apply.8 (Emphasis added)

d. It is evident and beyond any doubt that Claimants' Application, which specifically seeks explanations on the use or not of certain documents and on standards of evaluations, also exceeds, and also by far, the scope of the "interpretation" feature provided in Article 29.2 of the ICC Rules. The preceding quotations are clearly sufficient to support this assertion, without the need of further elaboration.

e. Furthermore, the decision rendered in Procedural Order No. 15 does not give rise to any conflict of interpretation:

Claimants filed a motion, and the Arbitral Tribunal declined to grant it. As simple and as clear as that.

f. The corollary of all the above is that evaluated from the substance of its content, Claimants' Application shall and will be denied. '

1
Although it does not have impact on the decision adopted in this Procedural Order, the Tribunal notes that Claimants' Application was not filed in the form provided in Article 29.2 of the ICC Rules, whereby "Any application for the correction of an error of the kind referred to in Article 29(1), or for the interpretation of an Award must be made to the Secretariat . . ." (Emphasis added).

2
Although decisions on interim or conservatory measures are not specifically considered as "awards" for purposes of their enforcement under the New York Convention, there is a tendency towards the broad interpretation of said Convention insofar to the scope of the term "award": Dr Gerold Herrmann states in the portion of a paper dealing with "Widening /Clarifying the definition of 'Award'": "There are at least six candidates for enforceability whose coverage by the New York Convention is controversial and quite often denied or at least doubtful: (i) Interim measures of protection . . ." (Gerold Herrmann, "Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration?" Arbitration International, London Court of International Arbitration, Vol. 15, No. 3, page 232). In terms of precedents, see Footnote No. 8 of Procedural Order No. 15, which mentions Publicis Communications, et at. v. True North Communications Inc. Craig, Park and Paulsson point out: "Although the 1975 Rules were indeed silent as to the power of the Arbitral Tribunal to correct or interpret awards, such silence should not have been seen as a total refusal on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal to correct or interpret an award. The addition of this article confirms a power that was previously available, though tacitly so." (W. Laurence Craig, William S. Park and Jan Paulsson, Annotated Guide to the 1998 ICC Arbitration Rules, Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, 1998, p. 160).

3
Page 4. In any event, Procedural Order No. 15 does not preclude any of Claimants' evidence from being heard and considered-as it will-at the appropriate time in these Proceedings.

4
Yves Derains and Eric A. Schwartz, A Guide to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998, p. 301.

5
W. Laurence Craig, William S. Park and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, 3rd Edition, Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, 2000, p. 408.

6
Permanent Court of International Justice. Case Polish Postal Services in Danzig, quoted by Robert S.A. Knutson, "The Interpretation of Arbitral Awards. When is a Final Award not Final", Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 11, No. 2, June 1994, p. 101.

7
Permanent Court of International Justice. Case Chorzow Factory, quoted by Knutson, op. cit., at p. 106.

8
Permanent Court of Arbitration of the Hague. Case UK - French Continental Shelf, quoted by Knutson, op. cit., at p. 106.